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FINDING THE SEX IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT:
HOW TITLE VII AND TORT SCHEMES MISS THE POINT
OF SAME-SEX HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT HARASSMENT
Yvonne Zylan*
It has been nearly a quarter century since the United States Supreme Court first
recognized the cause of action for a sexually hostile work environment under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In MeNtor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the
Court essentially adopted the view offered by legal academician Catharine
MacKinnon that harassment taking the form of a sexually hostile work environ-
ment is a manifestation of gender-based power. In so doing, the Court created a
remedy for many aggrieved employees, permitting redress in the federal courts for a
problem that makes many workplaces unbearable. At the same time, however by
adopting MacKinnon's theory of sexual violence, the Court virtually ensured that
a different class of plaintiffs-victims of anti-gay hostile work environments-
would be denied relief.
While some analysts trace this inequity to a conflicting array ofjudicial doctrine,
this Article claims that its source runs much deeper: to courts' misguided under-
standing of the nature of sexual harassment itself Although much of the history of
sexual harassment doctrine indicates courts' primary concern with determining
the motivation behind incidents of harassment, hostile environments that take the
form of sexual harassment cannot be explained as the simple expression of either
sexual desire or gender-specific hatred. Thus, courts' reliance upon a binary con-
ception of sexuality results in a fundamentally flawed jurisprudence. The Article
concludes by offering an alternative theory of sexual harassment highlighting the
independently sexual dimension of the behavior and argues that, because the na-
ture of sexual expression itself is highly ambivalent and fluid, courts are ill-
equipped to investigate the motivations underlying workplace interactions that
take a sexual form.
* Yvonne Zylan is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Hamilton College. Her previous
work on gender, political discourse, and social policy development has appeared in Gender
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can Sociological Review, and Social Forces. Her current research focuses on legal discourse
formation in contemporary sexual politics. Prior to joining the faculty at Hamilton College,
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INTRODUCTION
It has been nearly a quarter century since the United States Su-
preme Court first recognized the cause of action for a sexually
hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.2 In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Court essentially
adopted the view offered by legal academician Catharine
MacKinnon 2 that harassment taking the form of a sexually hostile
work environment is a manifestation of gender-based power. In so
doing, the Court created a remedy for many aggrieved employees,
permitting redress in the federal courts for a problem making
many workplaces unbearable. At the same time, by adopting the
MacKinnon theory of hostile environment harassment, the Court
laid the groundwork for a fundamental misunderstanding of the
nature of sexual harassment and the harm it produces. Moreover,
even as it provided for the inclusion of a new class of plaintiffs4 and
a new cause of action 5 in the absence of new statutory authority,
the Court virtually ensured that a different class of plaintiffs-
victims of anti-gay hostile work environments-would be denied
relief. In the absence of federal statutory authority prohibiting dis-
crimination against them, gay men and lesbians find themselves
practically and symbolically excluded from workplace protections
afforded heterosexuals.6
This Article examines the patchwork of federal and common law
rules that have emerged to address same-sex sexual harassment,
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66
(1986) (noting that protection under Title VII includes protection against severe and perva-
sive harassment that creates a hostile or offensive workplace environment).
2. CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION 40-47 (1979).
3. MeritorSav., 477 U.S. at 63-69.
4. This new class of plaintiffs is primarily composed of female employees subjected to
harassment by male employers and coworkers where such harassment does not include a
sexual quid pro quo: a demand for sexual contact in exchange for keeping one's job or for
advancement. For a detailed comparison between the different forms of harassment, see
generally MACKINNON, supra note 2.
5. The new cause of action alleges discrimination in the form of sexual harassment.
See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (holding that an employer may
be held liable for an objectively and a subjectively severe hostile work environment under
Title VII, subject to an affirmative defense which assesses the reasonableness of behavior of
employer and of plaintiff); Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (finding Title VII vio-
lated when workplace harassment is subjectively and objectively so severe or pervasive as to
alter the conditions of plaintiff's employment).
6. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE FOR
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER AMERICANS 2003 (2003), available at http://
www.hrc.org (follow "Publications" hyperlink; then follow "State of the Workplace" hyper-
link; then follow "State of the Workplace 2003" hyperlink).
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none of which is helpful for gay and lesbian victims of hostile work
environments. As others have noted, gay and lesbian harassment
victims regularly are denied relief, even when the hostility to which
they have been subjected is clearly sexual in nature and discrimina-
tory in its effect on the "terms and conditions of employment"7 and
would therefore almost certainly entitle them to relief were they
heterosexual.'
Indeed, while the Supreme Court has held in Oncale v. Sun-
downer Offshore Oil Services that same-sex sexual harassment can,
theoretically, be actionable under Title VII, the Court's language
has had the effect of foreclosing many avenues of redress for gay
and lesbian plaintiffs. 9 Not only has this matured Title VII juris-
prudence clearly established that homophobic ° discrimination is
not covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or any other federal
legislation, it has made it increasingly difficult for the victims of
such discrimination to pursue state statutory and common law tort
remedies that arguably apply." State anti-discrimination statutes
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (2000). For cases addressing the "terms and conditions
of employment" requirement, see Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787-89; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Meritor
Sav., 477 U.S. at 64; Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986).
8. See generally Marianne C. DelPo, The Thin Line Between Love and Hate: Same-Sex Hos-
tile-Environment Sexual Harassment, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1 (1999); David S. Schwartz, When
Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1697
(2002); Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After Oncale: Defining the
Boundaries of Actionable Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 677, 689-716 (1998).
9. While Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), established that
same-sex sexual harassment may be actionable under Title VII, the opinion of the Court
made it clear that such claims must allege one of two things: (1) that the harasser was moti-
vated by sexual desire for the target because he or she is identifiable as gay/lesbian, or (2)
that the harasser was motivated by hostility toward the presence of other men or women in
the workplace. Anti-gay harassment falls outside of the parameters of this statutory interpre-
tation. Id. at 79-80; see also discussion infra Section II.B.
10. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines homophobia to mean "irrational fear of,
aversion to, or discrimination against homosexuality or homosexuals." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 113 (10th ed. 1998). I use homophobia to refer to one aspect of
sexual animus: the hatred, aggression, and/or distaste directed toward sexual subjects and
objects (some of them described as particular sexual identities), which may be traced in
whole or in part to fear. Heterosexism is a distinguishable aspect of sexual animus, charac-
terized less by fear and more by the will to dominate and/or marginalize others. See, e.g.,
BELL HOOKS, Interview, in TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING BLACK 74, 167-76
(1989) (describing heterosexism as a subcategory of sexist oppression). The terms, as I use
them, are not interchangeable, though they are clearly related to one another and reference
phenomena that are not entirely discrete.
11. Numerous state anti-discrimination laws are couched in the same or similar lan-
guage as Title VII. For example, Ohio's non-discrimination law makes it illegal
[flor any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or
ancestry of any person, to discharge without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise
to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment.
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frequently are interpreted according to the guidelines established
by Title VII analyses. 2 Tort remedies elude plaintiffs claiming hos-
tile work environments,13 yet courts nonetheless reason that federal
and state anti-discrimination laws adequately cover such claims. 14
Additionally, analysis of some tort actions has begun to converge
with the legal analysis governing Tide VJI:15 "extreme" or "outra-
geous" conduct is increasingly difficult to distinguish from "severe"
and "pervasive" abuse. 6 State workers' compensation statutes cre-
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (LexisNexis 2001). There is no requirement that Ohio
follow federal law in interpreting the phrase "because of the ... sex ... of any person,"
which suggests that Ohio courts could apply the statute to discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. So far, Ohio (and many other states) has followed federal precedent in
interpreting its own broad statutory language. See Hampel v. Food Ingredients Specialties,
Inc., 729 N.E.2d 726, 731 (Ohio 2000) ("In prior cases, 'we have determined that federal
case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 2000e et seq., Title 42,
U.S. Code, is generally applicable to cases involving alleged violations of R.C. Chapter
4112.'"). State common law remedies, such as the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress (sometimes known as the tort of outrage), might also be thought to apply to cases
involving same-sex harassment; the behavior of some coworkers and supervisors in same-sex
hostile environment cases is frequently so shocking that courts have difficulty listing the
details of the alleged incidents. See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 225 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir.
2000) ("[Flor the sake of decency and judicial propriety, we hesitate before reciting in detail
the incidents of Simonton's abuse."). Nonetheless, as is discussed below, few courts have
been willing to find anti-gay harassment "outrageous." See discussion infra Section IV.
12. See, e.g., Griswold v. Fresenius U.S.A., Inc., 978 F. Supp. 718, 726 (N.D. Ohio 1997)
(noting that Ohio discrimination law requires proof fulfilling federal discrimination claim);
Alphonse v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 643 So. 2d 836, 839 (La. 1994) (noting that where
Louisiana law is substantially similar to Title VII language, analysis proceeds according to
Title VII); Belanger v. Saint-Gobain Indus. Ceramics, Inc., No. 95-1767B, 1999 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 72, at *11-12 (Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 1999) (using Title VII precedent to analyze Massa-
chusetts hostile environment harassment law); Hampe4 729 N.E.2d at 733 (noting that same-
sex harassment under Ohio law should be interpreted in light of Oncale); Harris v. Pameco
Corp., 12 P.3d 524, 532 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that Oregon law is modeled after Title
VII, thus Tide VII cases are considered "instructive"). But see Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp.
2d 403, 413 (D. Mass. 2002); Breitenfeldt v. Long Prairie Packing Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1170,
1176 (D. Minn. 1999) (noting that the Minnesota Human Rights Act diverges from federal
law with respect to the causation requirement).
13. See discussion infra Section IV.
14. See Bartalini v. Blockbuster Entm't, Inc., No. C-98-3943-SC, 1999 WL 1012383, at
*10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 1999); Metzger v. Compass Group USA, Inc., No. CivA 98-2386-GTV,
1999 WL 714116, at *10 (D. Kan. Sept. 1, 1999); Merritt v. Del. River Port Auth., Civil Action
No. 98-3313, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5896, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 1999); Pitak v. Bell Atl. Net-
work Serv. Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1354 (D.NJ. 1996). To the extent that federal and state anti-
discrimination statutes do not protect employees from anti-gay harassment, this reasoning is
clearly erroneous. As is demonstrated below, courts have almost uniformly held that anti-gay
harassment falls outside the purview of sex discrimination statutes. See infra Section II.B.
15. See Metzger, 1999 WL 714116, at *12 (noting that harassment amounts to "nothing
more than mere insults, indignities, and annoyances" in terms of degree and quality of ex-
tremity); Merritt, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5896, at *19 (describing evidence of the frequency
and length of the harassment as well as its offensive quality to determine that tort action
could be maintained).
16. The terms "extreme" and "outrageous" are common to state court definitions of
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F.
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ate an additional obstacle to would-be plaintiffs: state courts must
frequently determine whether they preempt claims brought under
anti-discrimination statutes or tort law. 7 In short, the existing juris-
prudence of Title VII-which does not apply the law to most forms
of anti-gay hostile environment harassment-has "trickled down"
to preclude any relief for gay and lesbian plaintiffs,"' including
those suffering from even the worst kinds of workplace abuse, in-
cluding batteries, assaults, threatened rapes, and wrongful
discharges. 9
The difficulty faced by gay and lesbian plaintiffs alleging sexual
harassment is hardly news to practitioners and scholars working in
this area of employment law. While some analysts trace this ineq-
uity to a conflicting array ofjudicial doctrine, its source runs much
deeper to courts' misguided understanding of the nature of sexual
harassment itself." Although much of the history of sexual
Supp. 2d 1108, 1124 (D. Or. 2000) (citing Williams v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist. of Or.,
958 P.2d 202, 205 (Or. Ct. App. 1998)) (discussing the "extreme and outrageous" element of
the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort); White v. Martin, 23 F. Supp. 2d 203, 208
(D. Conn. 1998) (citing DeLaurentis v. City of New Haven, 597 A.2d 807, 827-28 (Conn.
1991)); Murray v. Oceanside Unified Sch. Dist., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 28, 44 (Ct. App. 2000); Pet-
yan v. Ellis, 510 A.2d 1337, 1342-43 (Conn. 1986). Similarly, hostile environment harassment
must be "severe and pervasive" to be actionable under Title VII. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
17. See, e.g.,Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 418 (7th Cir. 1997) (observing that
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are barred by the exclusivity provisions of
the Worker's Compensation Act); Murray, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44 (noting that cause for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress was not barred by workers' compensation law because
claim founded upon actions "outside the normal part of the employment environment");
Tarver v. Calex Corp., 708 N.E.2d 1041, 1051 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (observing that Worker's
Compensation laws may only compensate for economic, not psychological harm, and may
not be adequate to address sexual harassment claims).
18. It also precludes relief for plaintiffs perceived to be gay or lesbian. See, e.g., Spear-
man v. Ford Motor Co., 231 E3d 1080, 1082 n.1 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that the plaintiff
who, while gay, never disclosed his sexual orientation to coworkers, failed to meet burden to
go forward on a claim alleging patently anti-gay forms of sexual harassment).
19. See, e.g., EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin Inc., 266 E3d 498, 501-02, 522 (6th Cir. 2001)
(failing to find a cause of action where defendant grabbed plaintiff's genitals); Hamner v. St.
Vincent Hosp., 224 F.3d 701, 708 (7th Cir. 2000) (failing to find a Title VII retaliation claim
actionable where gay man was promptly fired by a supervising physician despite the physi-
cian having been reprimanded for the anti-gay verbal abuse); Higgins v. New Balance
Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 257-58, 265 (1st Cir. 1999) (failing to find a Title VII claim
for a gay man ridiculed; verbally abused; assaulted with rubber bands, condiments, and hot
cement; physically grabbed and shaken by co-worker; threatened with death by coworker);
Klein v. McGowan, 198 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 1999) (failing to find a Title VII claim where
plaintiff was told by a supervisor, "If I ever find out you're a queer, I'll fire you," and was
called a "fucking homo" and hit with boxes by coworkers).
20. See, e.g., Johnson, 125 F.3d at 412 (finding that a single reference to the defen-
dant's desire to have a woman perform fellatio on him provided evidence that repeated,
forceful demands that plaintiff (a male) perform fellatio on him were "simply expressions of
animosity or juvenile provocation" and not sexual demands); see also Dick v. Phone Directo-
ries Co., 265 E Supp. 2d 1274, 1282-83 (D. Utah 2003) (observing that where a female
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harassment doctrine indicates courts' primary concern with de-
termining the motivation behind incidents of harassment, most
courts have failed to understand the independently sexual dimen-
sion of such acts. Existing case law indicates courts are unwilling to
view anti-gay harassment in sexual terms, preferring to view such
cases as examples of simple "teasing" or vulgar needling. Where
the harasser is presumed or asserted to be heterosexual in orienta-
tion, courts tend to dismiss even egregious forms of harassment as
exuberant forms of "horseplay.'2 On the other hand, where the
harasser is assertedly or constructively2 2 gay and the target is het-
erosexual, courts almost uniformly have upheld such actions as
properly brought, both under Title V11 25 and as common law tort
claims.2 ' This disparity-which is based on a perception about the
nature of sexual desire and its role in some forms of harassment-
reveals the fundamentally flawed view of human sexuality that lies
at the center of sexual harassment jurisprudence.
defendant allegedly pinched women's breasts and "humped" them, causation could not be
shown because evidence that defendant made references to fellatio undercut assumption
that she was a lesbian); English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 833, 845 (E.D.
Va. 2002) (quoting Johnson, 125 F3d at 412) (stating that ordinarily, sexually-tinged com-
ments are "simply expressions of animosity or juvenile provocation" and noting that
references to vaginas, wives, and girlfriends in the record "undercut" any inference that the
conduct was based on homosexual desire).
21. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1196 (4th
Cir. 1996); English, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 845. This is true in spite of the holding of Oncale,
which affirmed at least the potential viability of a same-sex harassment claim on facts sug-
gesting both the harasser and the target were heterosexual men. Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998). Although the McWilliams court allowed the
action to proceed as a sexual harassment claim, it held that such a claim could succeed only
if the plaintiff could demonstrate that the harasser was motivated by sexual desire or by an
antipathy toward men in the workplace; this virtually assured that the plaintiff would not
prevail on remand. McWilliams, 72 F3d at 1196.
22. By "assertedly gay," I mean where there is evidence in the record that the harasser
has asserted that he or she is gay. By "constructively gay," I mean that the plaintiff has per-
suaded the court that the harasser was gay. Often, this amounts to a recitation of workplace
rumor about the sexual identity of the alleged harasser. Typically, these cases are distin-
guishable from the Oncale-type cases in that the harasser acts individually. See Cummings v.
Koehnen, 568 N.W.2d 418, 423 (Minn. 1997). Where there is group sexual harassment,
including contact with the target's genitals, courts refuse to characterize the behavior as
sexual, characterizing it as gender-based bullying instead. See, e.g., McWilliams, 72 F.3d at
1196; see also discussion infra Section II.
23. See, e.g., Kelly v. City of Oakland, 198 F.3d 779 (9th Cir. 1999); Merritt v. Del. River
Port Auth., Civil Action No. 98-3313, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5896, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20,
1999).
24. See, e.g., Moran v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 00 Civ. 1275 (KMW) (RLE), 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19387, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2002) ("Courts have uniformly looked for evi-
dence of a harasser's homosexuality in deciding summary judgment motions in cases similar
to this."); Brewer v. Hillard, 15 S.W.3d 1, 7-11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999); Harris v. Pameco Corp.,
12 P.3d 524, 535 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
Finding the Sex in Sexual Harassment
The Article concludes by offering a different theory of sexual
harassment highlighting the independently sexual dimension of
the behavior and arguing that courts' inability to adequately theo-
rize sexuality precludes an equitable approach to adjudication of
sexual harassment claims. Hostile and abusive language and behav-
ior toward co-workers and workplace subordinates (of whatever
gender or sexual configuration) is the result of a complex interac-
tion of forces. The modern workplace is, for many employees, a
stultifying and alienating environment, and sexually aggressive be-
havior emerges as a particular release from the numbing day-to-day
work routine. Accordingly, hostile environments that take the form
of sexual harassment cannot be explained as the simple expression
of either sexual desire or gender-specific hatred. 5 Because the na-
ture of sexual expression itself is highly ambivalent and fluid,
courts are ill-equipped to investigate the motivations underlying
workplace interactions that take a sexual form.
In short, I argue that the inadequacy of the existing same-sex
harassment jurisprudence lies in a false binarism characterizing
courts' understanding of sexuality. That is, courts as institutions re-
duce complex social reality to binary (either/or) relationships that
line up in predictable ways. Thus, courts read "hatred vs. desire" as
a manifestation of "straight vs. gay" and vice versa; evidence of one
produces a conclusion of the other. The institutional logic of legal
decision-making means that courts' intervention in such cases
more often than not reinscribes the false sexual and gender binar-
ism that underlies homophobic social practices.
Because I locate the inadequacy of sexual harassment jurispru-
dence in its flawed epistemological basis, I depart from some other
critics who suggest that the problem may be solved by a refiguring
of the elements of the cause of action or through a correction of er-
roneous judicial reasoning. 6 For example, some critics trace the
disparate treatment of different-sex victims and same-sex victims to
a lack of consistency in judicial reasoning, claiming that a more
25. Cf DelPo, supra note 8 (arguing that "desire" and "hatred," while distinguishable,
may both be legally sufficient bases for harassment claims under Tide VII).
26. See, e.g., id. at 25 ("Why are juries allowed to consider the nature of the conduct as
circumstantial evidence of motivation in cross-gender cases but not in same-sex cases? ... It
is the content and type of the harassing behavior which should be scrutinized for 'sexuality'
(as a way to assess its fit into the EEOC definitions of prohibited conduct), not the sexual
orientation of the victim. The victim's sexual orientation should be irrelevant."); Schwartz,
supra note 8, at 1787 ( "[A 'sex per se' rule] could take the form of a conclusive presump-
tion that sexual conduct is 'because of sex' as a matter of law, which is how courts seemed to
treat the issue prior to Oncale. Alternatively, the rule could raise a rebuttable presumption,
shifting to the defendant the burden of producing evidence that the sexual conduct was not
because of sex.").
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inclusive standard (i.e., one that includes the juxtaposed motiva-
tions of "hatred" and "desire" as the judicially recognized bases of
prohibited conduct) would go far toward leveling the playing
field.27 This analytic approach, while offering a credible liberal po-
litical strategy, is problematic because it fails to address the
disciplinary effects of judicial policy-making. Courts do not merely
interpret and apply statutes and common law rules; they identify
subjects and objects of judicial intervention, in part by refusing to
identify other subjects and objects.28 Thus, while it might be facially
attractive to pursue a strategy aimed at defanging the causation
requirement, such an approach would leave intact the binary con-
ception of sexuality that animates and sustains homophobia and
heterosexism.
In light of feminist and post-structural critiques of the discipli-
nary effects and functions of state institutions, advocates of sexual
equality must first consider whether seeking judicial intervention
in relations implicating sexual identity is a promising political
course. The important question to be posed by those who would
see an end to heterosexist conduct (in the workplace and else-
where) is whether the courts, as hegemonic institutions engaged in the
central task of making distinctions, ought to be designated as the
agents of social change with respect to sexuality. 9 For reasons de-
scribed in greater detail below, I remain (at best) skeptical that
such a strategy will ultimately benefit marginalized sexual actors
and communities.
In what follows, I first provide in Part I a brief history of Title VII
jurisprudence, outlining the difficulties created in the case law by
the multivalent nature of the key statutory term, "sex." I trace these
difficulties-especially the inability of courts to find same-sex har-
assment actionable within the Title VII framework-to the courts'
conflation of sex, gender, and sexuality. Failure to distinguish be-
tween these three dimensions of identity and behavior stems, in
part, from courts' unexamined reliance upon Catharine
MacKinnon's theory of harassment as a form of sex discrimination.
I argue that courts employ a naturalized, "common sense" version
of MacKinnon's theory, rendering them unable to make sense of
same-sex harassment cases, which do not fit comfortably within the
MacKinnon framework. In Part II, I argue that the critics of
27. See generally DelPo, supra note 8; Schwartz, supra note 8.
28. See WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY
52-76 (1995).
29. See generally LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds.,
2002) (providing a series of compelling critical essays concerning the turn toward legalism
by progressive movements for social change).
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MacKinnon have not moved the jurisprudential discourse away
from her sex/gender/sexuality rubric; they thus are incapable of
theorizing what I term the independently sexual dimension of har-
assment. Combining the insights of Jessica Benjamin and Herbert
Marcuse, I then offer an alternative theory of sexual harassment
that is not reducible to the politics of gender inequality. Finally, in
Part III, I examine how common law tort actions similarly fail to
provide relief for gay and lesbian victims of same-sex harassment
and offer some thoughts about what the law can and cannot do to
address this conduct.
I. TITLE VII AND THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE "SEX"
The language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pertain-
ing to unlawful employment practices appears deceptively
straightforward:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.3°
The phrase "because of such individual's... sex"-the so-called
"causation requirement" of Title VII-is troublesome on many lev-
els. First, what does the term "sex" mean? In popular usage, sex can
refer to one's biological sex-to the fact that an individual is either
male or female, but it can also refer to sexual activity or sexual or-
gans. 1 Complicating matters considerably, feminist theory has
added the insight that "sex" (maleness/femaleness) is better
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (2000) (emphasis added).
31. The dictionary defines "sex" as:
1: either of the two major forms of individuals that occur in many species
and that are distinguished respectively as female or male
2: the sum of the structural, functional, and behavioral characteristics of
living things that are involved in reproduction by two interacting par-
ents and that distinguish males and females;
3a: sexually motivated phenomena or behavior[,] b: sexual intercourse
4: genitalia[.]
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1073 (10th ed. 1999).
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understood as a constellation of socially constructed features col-
lectively termed "gender."3 2 Indeed, to say the multiple nature of
the word "sex" has produced a problem or two within feminist the-
ory and practice would be a profound understatement. Within
contemporary feminist scholarship, sex is sometimes gender."5
Other times, sex is sexuality.34 For Catharine MacKinnon, a cru-
cially important contributor to sexual harassment jurisprudence,
gender versus sexuality is a distinction without a difference. In
MacKinnon's epistemological framework, gender is sexuality,
which is the product of male domination and the essence of power
itself.
35
Even if one is able to adequately define "sex," a second question
arising from the causation requirement immediately follows: what
does it mean to say something is "caused" by sex? In the early days
of sexual harassment litigation, one seemingly straightforward an-
swer was that the harassing behavior was the result of the harasser's
unreciprocated sexual desire for the target.36 This answer seemed
logical because most early harassment cases involved female targets
and male harassers, and because heterosexuality is the presumed
orientation of most people. 37 As Justice Scalia noted in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Oil Service.
32. SeeJUDITH P. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDEN-
TITY 6-13 (1990). As Butler puts it, "If gender is the cultural meanings that the sexed body
assumes, then a gender cannot be said to follow from a sex in any one way. Taken to its logi-
cal limit, the sex/gender distinction suggests a radical discontinuity between sexed bodies
and culturally constructed genders." Id. at 6. Note that unlike many feminist theorists, Butler
does not claim that "gender" is inscribed upon an anatomical "sex." Instead, she claims that
"sex" and "gender" are equally constructed by social and cultural forces, with one function
of "gender" being the perpetuation of the idea that "sex" is fundamental, or "prediscursive."
Id. at 6-7. See generally R.W. CONNELL, GENDER AND POWER: SOCIETY, THE PERSON, AND SEX-
UAL POLITICS (1987);JUDITH LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER (1994).
33. BUTLER, supra note 32, at 6-13; LORBER, supra note 32, at 1-12; see also THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER (Judith Lorber & Susan A. Farrell eds., 1991).
34. See ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 121-43 (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 126-54 (1989). For a foundational, nuanced
treatment of the relationship between biological sex, sexuality, and the social identities asso-
ciated with them as gender, see generally SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1st
American ed., Knopf 1953) (1949).
35. SeeMACKINNON, supra note 34, at 126-54.
36. Note that this can be an issue even in cases not alleging quid pro quo harassment: a
demand for sexual contact that either promises tangible job benefits in return for compli-
ance or threatens adverse economic consequences in return for lack of compliance, or both.
Many cases alleging hostile environment harassment assert that repeated, unrequited de-
mands for sexual contact from a coworker or supervisor-while not leading to specific
employment consequences in terms of compensation or advancement-make the workplace
an abusive setting.
37. It is indisputable that this is the fundamental assumption held by most Americans.
However, there has long been empirical evidence of a high incidence of homosexuality and
bisexuality in the population, placing this truism in doubt (even when evaluated according
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Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination
easy to draw in most male-female sexual harassment situa-
tions, because the challenged conduct typically involves
explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is reasonable
to assume those proposals would not have been made to
someone of the same sex.38
In same-sex harassment cases, however, courts have had greater
difficulty in assessing the role of sexual desire in motivating the
harassment. Because courts assume sexuality is dichotomous (i.e.,
persons are either homo- or heterosexual, but either way, orienta-
tion is fixed and certain), they are hard pressed to make sense of
cases alleging demonstrably sexual forms of harassment that ap-
pear to fall outside the expected sexual behavior of the litigants.
Instead of relying on an examination of the acts per se, courts at-
tempt to divine the purpose of the acts in assessing whether or not
they were "sexual" enough to be actionable. This difficulty thus does
not emerge because the cases are factually more complex.4° In-
stead, courts' inability to say with certainty what motivates same-sex
sexual harassment results from a fundamental flaw in existing sex-
ual harassment jurisprudence: the conflation of sexuality with
gender.
A. The Influence of Catharine MacKinnon's Scholarship
on Title VIJurisprudence
While even the Supreme Court has acknowledged the role of
Catharine MacKinnon's scholarship in shaping the jurisprudence
of sexual harassment,"1 no court expressly has recognized or
to purely behavioral criteria). See, e.g., ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN S. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALI-
TIES: A STUDY OF DwVERsrTY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN (1978); ALFRED C. KINSEY, SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948). A prior question, of even greater import, is what it
means to "count" one as homo-, hetero-, or bisexual. To quote Kinsey's observation of over a
half-century ago: "The world is not to be divided into sheep and goats." KINSEY, supra, at
639.
38. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Oil Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
39. See id.;Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 E3d 408, 412-13 (7th Cir. 1997); McWilliams v.
Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1996); Hampel v. Food In-
gredients Specialties, Inc., 729 N.E.2d 726, 731 (Ohio 2000).
40. More to the point, the unique difficulty in assessing motivation in same-sex cases is
not traceable to the fact that cases alleging different-sex harassment are factually less com-
plex than those alleging same-sex harassment. There is no simple answer to the question of
what motivates sexually aggressive behavior in the workplace. See discussion infra Part III.
41. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998).
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embraced the theoretical model of sexuality that is central to her
scholarship and which underlies the jurisprudence. In
MacKinnon's account, sexuality, gender, and power are mutually
constitutive: "men in particular, if not men alone, sexualize hierar-
chy; gender is one."2 For MacKinnon, sexuality and violence are
virtually indistinguishable.43 Moreover, sexuality and violence are
created by men to ensure the perpetuation of male dominance.4
Women, in this view, are the objects of male domination, with no
independent sexual identity of their own.4' Even more importantly
for sexual harassment analysis, in MacKinnon's account, the word
"sex" no longer has three separate meanings (sexuality, biologi-
cal/anatomical sex, and gender); instead, the three meanings are
collapsed into one signifier of male domination.46 Based on this
connection, MacKinnon theorizes:
To be clear: what is sexual is what gives a man an erection.
Whatever it takes to make a penis shudder and stiffen with the
experience of its potency is what sexuality means culturally.
Whatever else does this, fear does, hostility does, hatred does,
the helplessness of a child or a student or an infantilized or
restrained or vulnerable woman does, revulsion does, death
does. Hierarchy, a constant creation of person/thing,
top/bottom, dominance/subordination relations, does.47
It seems unlikely that most courts analyzing harassment claims
understand that, in adopting the "because of sex" formulation
from MacKinnon's analysis of harassment, they also are subscribing
to this theory. Yet, if one subscribes to such a view of sexuality, it
becomes easy to see how any sort of sexual harassment of women
42. MAcKINNON, supra note 34, at 127.
43. As Catherine MacKinnon puts it, "[iln this light, the major distinction between in-
tercourse (normal) and rape (abnormal) is that the normal happens so often that one
cannot get anyone to see anything wrong with it." Id. at 146. This may be one of
MacKinnon's most controversial claims. Few feminists, even those who generally agree with
MacKinnon's view that sexual harassment is a form of sex-based discrimination, would also
subscribe to her view that sex and rape are barely distinguishable. For our purposes, it is
enough to note that this assertion forms an important part of MacKinnon's theory of sexual-
ity as male power.
44. Id. at 140.
45. "There is no such thing as a woman as such; there are only walking embodiments
of men's projected needs." Id. at 119. Note that MacKinnon uses the term "woman" to mean
a socially constructed woman; this being the case, it matters not whether the parties are
biologically male or female. What matters is the social position occupied. If this sounds con-
fusing, it is because the account may very well be tautological.
46. "To be rapable, a position that is social not biological, defines what a woman is." Id.
at 178.
47. Id. at 137.
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by men-sexual imagery on the walls, uninvited (or even invited)
sexual advances, invasive touching-would constitute a form of
discrimination on the basis of sex, whether or not sex is defined as
gender, biological sex, or sexuality. Thus, many courts simply as-
sumed the connection between gender, biological sex and sexuality
without explicating it.4a In short, while MacKinnon provided a the-
ory of how sex, sexuality, and gender were interconnected-with
this interconnection most obvious in cases of sexual harassment or
rape-those who subscribed to her claim that sexual harassment is
a form of sex-based discrimination largely assumed a natural con-
nection between the three. Courts typically refer to this assumption
as a "natural" or "reasonable" inference. It should be readily ap-
parent why advocates of gender and sexual equity ought to resist
this reflexive inferential gesture.
As new forms of harassment, particularly cases of same-sex har-
assment, came to the courts' attention, however, this presumed
relationship gradually was exposed.4 9 Because they had not
adopted (nor even in all likelihood understood) the full
MacKinnon theory of harassment, courts struggled to fit the diver-
sity of sexual harassment cases within the existing judicially-created
framework. For example, many cases like Oncale involved the har-
assment of assertedly heterosexual men by other assertedly
heterosexual men. Others involved the sexually explicit harass-
ment of self-identified gay men or lesbians by heterosexual
coworkers or supervisors.51 In some cases, this harassment included
what were, on their face, invitations to sexual contact.52 In other
cases, self-identified or presumed gay/lesbian coworkers or super-
visors harassed assertedly heterosexual people of the same sex,
frequently by subjecting them to uninvited sexual advances or
48. See, e.g., O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 728 (1st Cir. 2001); Pollard v.
E.I. Dupont de Nemours Co., 213 F.3d 933, 941-43 (6th Cir. 2000); Burns v. McGregor Elec.
Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 964-66 (8th Cir. 1993); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469,
1482-86 (3rd Cir. 1990).
49. See Hopkins v. Balit. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751 (4th Cir. 1996); Quick v.
Donaldson Co., 90 E3d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir. 1996); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99
E3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996); English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 833, 838
(E.D. Va. 2002).
50. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir.
1996); Breitenfeldt v. Long Prairie Packing Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1176 (D. Minn. 1999).
51. Simonton v. Runyon, 225 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic
Shoe, Inc., 194 E3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999); Dillon v. Frank, 952 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1992).
52. The most common advances include a request or demand for fellatio or anal sex.
See, e.g., Simonton, 225 E3d at 124;Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 E3d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 1997).
Note that the vast majority of same-sex harassment cases that have been brought, prior to
and after the Oncale decision, involve male litigants.
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contacts. 53 Thus, courts had to delve more deeply into issues of
causation and motivation, as the gender/sex/sexuality configura-
tions before them multiplied and diversified.
Although the conduct in many of these same-sex harassment
cases was strikingly uniform, courts responded in divergent ways
depending upon the perceived54 sexual orientation of the parties.5
In fact, prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Oncale, courts no-
ticeably were split on the question of whether any same-sex
harassment cases should be actionable under Title VII.56 As the
next section of this Article demonstrates, although the Court at-
tempted to clarify the status of same-sex harassment in Oncale, a
review of recent case law indicates continued inconsistent treat-
ment of same-sex hostile environment cases. In short, lacking a
firm theoretical basis for distinguishing between different forms of
same-sex harassment, courts have resorted to mainstream cultural
attitudes about homosexuality in finding some forms of harass-
ment actionable, and others outside the scope of Title VII
protection.
B. Same-Sex Harassment Under Title VII: Post-Oncale
Cases alleging same-sex harassment as a violation of Title VII
have always faced uncertainty in the courts. The Supreme Court's
determination in Oncale that same-sex harassment could be action-
able under the statute has done little to change this. In fact, cases
with gay or lesbian plaintiffs, if anything, increasingly are deemed
53. See Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009-10 (7th Cir. 1999); Kelly v.
City of Oakland, 198 F.3d 779, 783 (9th Cir. 1999); Merritt v. Del. River Port Auth., Civil
Action No. 98-3313, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5896, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 1999); Carney v.
City of Shawnee, 38 E Supp. 2d 905 907 (D. Kan. 1999); Brewer v. Hillard, 15 S.W.3d 1, 7-11
(Ky. Ct. App. 1999). But see Smith v. USA Truck, Inc., Civil Nos. 97-2171 & 97-2172, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3455, at *30 (W.D. Ark. 1998) (construing Arkansas Law with reference to Title
VII to hold that "one instance" of unwelcome act of fellatio does not give rise to employer
liability).
54. The sexual orientation of the parties is identified according to the perception of
the courts (on their own reading of the record) or by the alleged harasser(s) or target(s).
55. In some cases, the sexual orientations of the plaintiff and the defen-
dant/harasser(s) were expressly alleged in the record. See Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231
F.3d 1080, 1082 (7th Cir. 2000); Simonton, 225 F.3d at 124. In others, courts determined
whether or not the orientation of the parties might be deductively inferred by the evidence.
See King v. Super Serv., Inc., 68 F. App'x 659, 663 (6th Cir. 2003); Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 1009.
In still others, courts determined whether or not there was a material question as to the
orientation of one or more of the parties in rendering decisions on motions for summary
judgment or demurrers. See Merritt, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5896, at *10.
56. Storrow, supra note 8, at 689-716.
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to fall outside the scope of Tide VII, 57 while cases with gay or les-
bian (or constructively gay or lesbian) harassers almost uniformly
are considered within the scope of Tide VII.5s There is no princi-
pled reason for this pattern of decisions. 59 As mentioned above,
courts simply have no idea how to extend the MacKinnon ap-
proach to same-sex cases because they have not grasped how the
MacKinnon theory operates to link sexual harassment and sex-
based discrimination. Combined with a lack of statutory guidance,
6
0
this theoretical fuzziness has led to a normative approach to same-
sex Tide VII cases that replicates mainstream attitudes about the
threatening quality of unwelcome homosexual advances. A recent
trend in judicial reasoning of same-sex harassment cases reveals
this tendency. While different-sex harassment cases continue to
distinguish between the "severe and pervasive" and "causation" re-
quirements, courts attempting to apply the Supreme Court's
holding in Oncale have collapsed the two, sometimes openly rede-
ploying the Court's dicta to justify reading a "context" requirement
into the causation requirement. What this amounts to is the codifi-
cation of homosexual panic: where the motivation for the
harassment is homosexual desire, the severity/pervasiveness re-
quirement is almost automatically met.
6
'
As discussed, the Oncale decision establishes that same-sex har-
assment can be an actionable Tide VII violation. The decision,
57. Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1084; Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp., 224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th
Cir. 2000); Simonton, 225 F.3d at 124-25; Cash v. Ill. Div. of Mental Health, 209 E3d 695, 696
(7th Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999);
Klein v. McGowan, 198 E3d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 1999); Metzger v. Compass Group USA, Inc.,
No. Civ.A. 98-2386-GTV, 1999 WL 714116, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 1, 1999); see also Schmedding
v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1995) (permitting the case to proceed, seemingly
because plaintiff asserted he was falsely accused of being gay by his harassers).
58. La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 480-81 (5th Cir. 2002); Kely, 198 F.3d 779,
783, 787; Shephes, 168 F.3d at 1009-10; Merritt, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5896, at *10; Brewer, 15
S.W.3d at 4-5, 11-12; Harris v. Pameco Corp., 12 P.3d 524, 535 (Or. CL App. 2000).
59. The only possible principle at work would be one affirming the right to engage in
discrimination on the basis of perceived or claimed sexual orientation. Courts may be infer-
ring this right from legislative inaction, Simonton, 225 F.3d at 125, or they may be making a
determination on their own that such discrimination should not be actionable. Certainly,
there is sufficient evidence that Congress is reluctant to extend protection from discrimina-
tion to gay men and lesbians. Id. (using the repeated failure to enact the Employment
Non-Discrimination Act as evidence that Congress does not intend to protect against sexual
orientation discrimination); see also Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a),
110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)) (precluding
recognition of same-sex marriages).
60. The Defense of Marriage Act does not define "sex." § 2(a), 110 Stat. at 2419.
61. See, e.g., English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 833, 842 n.7 (E.D. Va.
2002) ("Although the Court made this pronouncement during its discussion of the severity
prong of a same-sex discrimination claim, courts have applied Oncales instruction concern-
ing context to the element of because of sex.").
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however, complicates the issue by identifying three nominal routes
by which a plaintiff can make out a same-sex case under Title VII.
First, the plaintiff might offer "credible evidence that the harasser
was homosexual." Alternatively, the plaintiff might offer evidence
that a harasser used "sex-specific and derogatory terms" to demon-
strate that he or she was motivated by a "general hostility" to the
presence of members of his or her same sex in the workplace. Or
the plaintiff might offer comparative evidence of the disparate
treatment of men and women by the harasser. The Court's lan-
guage did not suggest this was an exhaustive list of evidentiary
paths a same-sex harassment plaintiff might pursue, leaving would
be litigants guessing as to what the Court understood the essence
of same-sex hostile environment harassment to be.62
Thus, while the Oncale Court required plaintiffs to demonstrate
that the alleged discrimination occurred "because of ... sex," it
refused to define the requirement. Instead, the Court listed three
possible ways in which a plaintiff might approach the evidentiary
burden. However, the language of the opinion suggests that the
Court has defined "because of... sex" to mean: because of the sex-
ual desire of the harasser for the target (the gay harasser), or
because of the harasser's animus toward the presence of one sex in
the workplace,63 or because of some underlying impulse to treat
the sexes differently.6
In a highly influential law review article critical of existing sexual
harassment jurisprudence, Katherine Franke focused on the latter
interpretation as one way of arguing for the inclusion of anti-gay
harassment. 65 Franke has suggested same-sex harassment can be
construed as a form of sex-based discrimination because it is a way
of enforcing gender conformity. In Franke's view, the sexually ex-
plicit harassment that plaintiffs like Joseph Oncale faced results
when the harassers detect a failure by the plaintiff to exhibit suffi-
ciently masculine characteristics to be distinguished from a
woman. Thus, harassment acts as a "technique of sexism" in en-
forcing gender conformity.
66
62. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
63. In this case, such animus would mean the desire to be the only male or female in
the workplace, since a desire to have a workplace entirely free of members of plaintiff's gen-
der would be logically impossible in a same-sex harassment case.
64. For example, one might use sexually profane language with men but not with
women.
65. Katherine Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691, 692
(1997).
66. Id. at 696.
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Since the Oncale decision, arguments predicating Title VII
claims on a "sex-plus" 67 theory of same-sex harassment as discrimi-
nation have become more frequent,' s with inconsistent results. In
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,69 for example, a gay man
brought a claim that his harassment included sex-based discrimina-
tion in the form of ridicule for failure to conform to masculine
stereotypes. 70 In appealing summary judgment of the case, Higgins
reframed his initial argument (which had rested on a Minnesota
Human Rights statute forbidding discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation) to claim a Tide VII violation on the basis of
gender-based discrimination. 71 Relying on state court precedent
that precludes appellate review of a theory not raised at the trial
court level, the First Circuit refused to entertain the new claim be-
cause it had not been raised below.7 2 In dicta, however, the court
provided an optimistic view of whether such a claim, if timely
raised, might survive summary judgment:
Be that as it may, in a footnoted rumination, the district court
questioned whether plaintiffs in same-sex sexual harassment
cases might properly argue that they were harassed because
they did not conform to gender-based stereotypes .... We
think it prudent to note that the precise question that the dis-
trict court posed is no longer open: [the Oncale decision]
confirms that the standards of liability under Title VII, as they
have been refined and explicated over time, apply to same-sex
plaintiffs just as they do to opposite-sex plaintiffs. In other
67. Courts have used this term to denote gender-based discrimination to distinguish it
from sex-based discrimination. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-52
(1989). In other words, it applies where the discrimination is alleged to result because of
plaintiff's perceived failure to sufficiently match his/her masculinity/femininity to his/her
biological sex. Id.
68. Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000); Simonton v. Runyon, 225
F3d 122 (2d Cir. 2000); Cash v. Ill. Div. of Mental Health, 209 F.3d 695 (7th Cir. 2000); Higgins
v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 E3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999); Samborski v. W. Valley Nuclear
Serv. Co., 99-CV-0213E (M), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20263 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1999).
69. Higgins, 194 F.3d at 257-59.
70. Plaintiff presented evidence at trial that his peers frequently mocked him, by
speaking to him in high-pitched voices and imitating feminine gestures to him. Id. at 259.
71. Id. at 260-61.
72. Id. at 259-60. It appears that many cases litigated around the time of the Oncale
decision were pled inconsistently, or somewhat broadly, as the parties were (understandably)
unsure of how to pursue same-sex harassment claims. Given the liberal pleading require-
ments at the federal level, courts are expected to consider a broad range of theories of
liability when considering motions for summary judgment, even when those theories were not
specifically pled. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Some appellate courts have recognized this in examining
newly-raised "sex plus" theories on appeal. Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 864 (8th
Cir. 1995). Others have not. Hamner, 224 E3d at 707; Higgins, 194 F.3d at 259-60.
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words, just as a woman can ground an action on a claim that
men discriminated against her because she did not meet
stereotyped expectations of femininity ... a man can ground
a claim on evidence that other men discriminated against him
because he did not meet stereotyped expectations of mascu-
linity.73
On the other hand, a Seventh Circuit court was equally forceful
in Hamner v. St. Vincent Hospital in its conclusion that a gender-
stereotyping claim brought by a gay plaintiff would not be
actionable under Tite VII. 74 Similar to Higgins, the Seventh Circuit
refused to rule on plaintiff's claim of homophobic harassment con-
sisting of gender-specific mockery 75 because it was not raised in the
court below.76 Unlike Higgins, however, the Seventh Circuit stated
in dicta that:
[T]his argument has no merit. We have already established
from Hamner's testimony that he believed that Edwards's ges-
tures evinced his "homophobia," and thus pertained only to
Hamner's sexual orientation, and not to his sex. And the re-
cord contains no evidence to indicate that Edwards's gestures
were motivated by a general hostility to men, which would be
an example of the type of evidence necessary in this case to
sustain Hamner's [claim] 7'
78The Seventh Circuit also cited Oncale in reaching this position.
The "gender stereotyping" (or "sex-plus") framework embraced
by Franke and others may offer an avenue of redress to some gay
and lesbian plaintiffs who can argue that the hostility they faced
from supervisors or coworkers was based, at least in part, on a dis-
taste for gender nonconformity. Such an approach may be
sustainable in some courts and in some cases.79 It should be pursued
73. Higgins, 194 F.3d at 261.
74. Hamner, 224 F.3d at 707.
75. In this case, plaintiff alleged, in part, that a supervisor lisped and "flipped his
wrists" at him. Id. at 703.
76. Id. at 707.
77. Id.
78. Id. The Hamner court's citation of Oncale appears to indicate that it took the "three
evidentiary routes" to proving sex-based discrimination to be exclusive of the ways in which a
plaintiff could satisfy the "because of... sex" requirement. Id. at 707 n.5; see also Sweet v.
Mulberry Lutheran Home, Cause No. IP02-0320-C-H/K, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11373, at *7-
8 (S.D. Ind. June 6, 2003); Samborski v. W. Valley Nuclear Serv. Co., 99-CV-0213E(F), 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12745, at *9-11 (W.D.N.Y.June 25, 2002).
79. For example, where the plaintiff exhibits or is perceived to exhibit atypical gender
identity.
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if feasible, and if the approach accurately reflects the nature of the
harassment at issue.8° The Franke approach, like the MacKinnon
approach, however, misses what may be termed the "independently
sexual component" of sexual harassment.81 Thus, it fails to move
the discourse of sexual harassment outside of the MacKinnon
framework and consequently makes use of only a fraction of the
potential scope of Tide VII. Moreover, it inadvertently may con-
tribute to the polarized construction of sexuality that forms the
basis of homophobic conduct in the first instance.
II. FINDING THE SEX(UALITY) IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT
UNDER TITLE VII
Courts will often go a long way to avoid discussing sexuality, even
when they are adjudicating sexual harassment claims.82 A particu-
larly strained example of the judicial gymnastics that may be
required to avoid discussing sexuality in a sexual harassment case is
offered in the case of McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervi-
sors,8 3 discussed at length by Richard F. Storrow in his analysis of the
pre- and post-Oncale landscape.84 In McWilliams, the plaintiff was a
cognitively disabled man who was subjected to a variety of sexually-
charged contacts by his coworkers. 5 At one point, McWilliams was
fondled to the point of erection by one of his harassers. s6 Yet, the
McWilliams court saw the behavior by plaintiffs coworkers as
80. That is, where one can reasonably assert that the harassment was more or less a
product of gender conflict, rather than sexual desire or (as is discussed below) a more com-
plex mixture of sexual desire and antipathy.
81. Given their very different intellectual and political commitments, this roping to-
gether of Franke and MacKinnon might be, at first blush, unsettling. It should be noted,
therefore, that I am not claiming that the justificatory frameworks from which Franke and
MacKinnon produce their (to my mind) de-sexed approaches to sexual harassment are in
any way identical. In fact, MacKinnon's approach de-sexualizes harassment by conflating
gender with sexuality, while Franke's approach rests on a conviction that the focus on sexu-
ality in harassment masks the fact that sexuality is but one tool of sexism. See Kathryn Franke,
Putting Sex to Work, in LEFT LEGALIsM/LEFr CRITIQUE, supra note 29, at 290.
82. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 76 (1998) (limit-
ing recitation of the facts "in the interest of both brevity and dignity"); Dick v. Phone
Directories Co., 265 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1276 (D. Utah 2003) (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77).
83. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir.
1996).
84. Storrow, supra note 8, at 700-02.
85. McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1196.
86. Id.
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horseplay rather than sexual harassment.87 In the absence of evi-
dence that any (or presumably all) of the harassing workers were
actually homosexual, the court was unwilling to find that the har-
assment occurred because of McWilliams' [male] sex.8 In this case,
the court implied that by "sex" it meant biological sex. Yet such a
definition appears difficult to sustain given the facts; was the court
suggesting that the fact that McWilliams had a penis was irrelevant
to the conduct of his coworkers? 9
Storrow notes that a number of courts, like the McWilliams court,
have made the mistake of presuming that sexually-harassing con-
duct between men in the workplace emerges not from sexual
desire but from some more generic impulse toward "horseplay."90
Storrow argues that rather than make this mistake, courts should
presume desire where sexually explicit behavior seems to beg them
to locate it, thus providing same-sex harassment victims the same
presumption (that the harassment occurred because of the target's
sex) as that provided opposite-sex targets. 9' Storrow is exactly right
on this score. It is a feature of homophobia that courts seem
bound and determined not to see a form of sexual desire where it
is clearly staring them in the face.
Unfortunately, Storrow does not go further in this analysis be-
cause his ambition is to locate same-sex cases within the existing
Title VII jurisprudence. 9 2 If, however, we push this reasoning to its
logical conclusion, we can see cases like McWilliams do not belong
under the rubric of Title VII given the existing, MacKinnon-
inspired jurisprudence. They are not cases of sex-based discrimina-
tion as it has been articulated under sex discrimination law, which
are cases of sex-gender discrimination. Cases like McWilliams, on
the other hand, posit a form of sexual harassment that does not
necessarily correspond to, support, or manifest gender-based dis-
87. Id. (describing the conduct at issue as "puerile and repulsive" but not within the
ambit of Title VII); id. at 1197 (stating that McWilliams' supervisors were on notice of, at
most, "teasing and 'horseplay' ").
88. Storrow, supra note 8, at 702.
89. Storrow notes that McWilliams also was required to "fellate" a coworker's finger
and was subjected to a mock anal rape with a broom handle. Id. at 700. Are such activities
meaningful if the target's biological/anatomical sex is irrelevant? Would such harassment
have meant the same thing either to the harassers or to the target if the target had been
female? Would it even have occurred?
90. Id. at 699, 701-02, 740. From whence this impulse derives, is a question completely
open to speculation. So many courts seem to think it endemic to male culture, that one can
at least say this about it: it is something like a biological drive but perhaps even more basic,
because judges are likely to find it as the truly motivating force even when all indications
point toward sexual desire as the culprit.
91. Id. at 736-42.
92. Id. at 740-45.
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crimination. A man fondling or grabbing another man's genitals
may be doing so for reasons that have nothing to do with the status
of men in the workplace, or with the dictates of gender conformity.
The harassment of women by men on the job was first deemed
actionable because it represented gender-based power; men exert
their power over women in part through masculinity as it is ex-
pressed in sexual dominance.93 This is what most people thought
they were addressing when they advocated for the inclusion of
sexual harassment claims within the rubric of Title VII anti-
discrimination law. But some advocates wanted more. MacKinnon
argued the biological sex of the harasser and the target were
immaterial to the gendered dimensions of sexual harassment, and
therefore irrelevant to whether such claims would fall under Title
VII (they would) .9 For MacKinnon, the core nature of sexuality
was gendered power, whether it was expressed between men and
women, men and men, women and women, or a man or woman
alone in his/her most private moments. Susan Estrich followed
MacKinnon's lead, writing that:
Aggressive fondling, drunken lurches, exclusive attention to
anatomy, abusive language, and the treatment of women
solely as sexual objects may, empirically speaking, be consid-
ered acceptable behavior outside of the workplace .... What
makes such conduct generally acceptable outside of work is
that men say it is, and that women have no say.95
For Estrich, the solution is a far more expansive application of Ti-
tle VII: she would prohibit all forms of sexual interaction in the
workplace: "Men and women could, of course, violate the rule; but
the power to complain, once in the hands of the less powerful,
might well 'chill' sexual relations by evening the balance of power
between the two."
96
93. See discussion supra Part I.A.
94. MacKinnon, supra note 34, at 141-42. This is because, according to MacKinnon,
biological sex is itself socially constructed. Id. From MacKinnon's perspective, because the
gendered quality of sexual domination is not dependent upon the anatomical differences
between men and women, there is no principled reason to restrict harassment claims under
Title VII to cases involving male harassers and female targets. Id. at 131-32, 178-79. Janet
Halley provides a compelling analysis of MacKinnon's briefing of the Oncale case to the Su-
preme Court. Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in LE-r LEGALISM/LEF-r CRITIQUE, sUpra
note 29, at 80. Halley convincingly argues that MacKinnon may have invited the Court to
articulate a homophobic standard of causation-one that equates a finding of "homosexual-
ity" in the "perpetrator" of harassment with an adequate showing of but-for causation. Id.
95. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 859 (1991).
96. Id. at 860.
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Critics of the MacKinnon approach have tended to argue for a
different tack than that argued by Estrich, but on the same (sex-
gender) terrain. Katherine Franke, as noted above, has argued that
same-sex harassment should be actionable under Title VII not be-
cause men and women are interchangeable in the MacKinnon97
sense, but because sexual harassment is a "technology of sex-
ism."9 8 According to Franke, what men are doing when they are
grabbing the genitalia of other men is not seeking sexual gratifica-
tion, but engaging in a form of gender discipline.9  Franke's
argument is appealing, but it too denies the possibility of an inde-
pendently sexual dimension of harassment. When a man grabs
another man's genitals, might he be doing so out of a sexual im-
pulse that is at least in part not driven by the (according to Franke
and others) more fundamental drive to enforce gender domi-
nance? Even posing the question this way seems heretical by
feminist standards. It is suggesting that there may be a sexuality
beyond gender. Is that, in fact, what I am suggesting?
Yes and no. I am arguing there is a sexual dimension that, while
deeply grounded in gender (and, by extension, gender inequality),
is not driven by it--or at least, is not driven by the desire to per-
petuate the gender inequality or domination that forms the
language of its expression. This sexual dimension has both a posi-
tive and negative valence. It is experienced as desire and disgust,
sometimes simultaneously.100 In the case of a homophobic work
environment, for example, one can view the efforts of the pre-
sumptively heterosexual harassers as attempts to discipline the
gender of effeminate (gay) men or masculine (lesbian) women as
Franke's approach might have us do. Or one could, like
MacKinnon, 1 see the harassment as male sexuality run amok as
usual: uncontained in the case of the physical harassment of gay
men; oppressively forceful in the denial of, for example, a lesbian's
alternative erotic attachments.
97. By this I mean that MacKinnon imagines a totalizing structure of male domination.
See MACKINNON, supra note 34, at 116-17. Within this structure, biological males and fe-
males may occupy or play different "roles" but the structure itself is hierarchically male. Id.
at 118-19, 141-42. In other words, a lesbian woman may be the boss, but when she harasses
her female secretary, she is objectifying her as any male boss would. Sexuality is imprinted
with gender domination, whether it is heterosexual or homosexual. Id. at 141-42, 178-79.
98. Franke, supra note 65, at 693.
99. Id.
100. The ambivalent quality of sexual feeling has been recognized at least since Freud.
See SIGMUND FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY (James Strachey trans.,
Basic Books 1962) (1905).
101. MAcKINNON, supra note 34, at 136, 141, 143.
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Alternatively, an approach that gives credence to the independ-
ently sexual dimension of harassment might see the homophobic
workplace in quite different terms. The harassment of the gay man
by male coworkers may be said to emerge from the conflicted sex-
ual desires of the presumptively heterosexual harassers; distaste
and desire often commingle to produce a violent denial. The les-
bian's choice is ridiculed or dismissed as "disgusting" because of
the sexual polarity that is demanded by a homophobic culture.
While one's own sexuality is blessed, natural, and comfortably
physical, alternative sexualities are distasteful, foreign, inexplicable
and disgusting. These are sexual evaluations at bottom.
Certainly it can be argued that the very nature of sexuality-the
need to polarize and fix as heterosexual or homosexual one's sex-
ual attributes-is itself a function of gender and gender inequality.
I would not argue strenuously against that point. In a gendered
social order, it is impossible to test this hypothesis. It seems plausi-
ble that a significant part of sexual expression is shaped by gender
ideals and gendered practices. However, it is equally plausible-
and cases like Oncale seem to suggest-that there is a dimension to
sexuality that is not straightforwardly gendered. And there are al-
ternative explanations. Perhaps the need to polarize and fix sexual
orientation0 2 is a function of "western metaphysical dualism": the
need to polarize and value differently all social and cultural dis-
tinctions. 10 3 Alternatively, it may be a manifestation of a structure of
the mind,'0° or the nature of language and the result of how lan-
guage is acquired.0 5 Or maybe the myth of gender polarity is
derived from the myth of sexual polarity. Perhaps it is the other
way around. I contend that, contra our tendency to conceive of
sexuality, gender, and sex as constituting a binary system, sexuality
is, instead, complex and fluid, reaching beyond the dichotomous
categories of male and female, masculine and feminine, hetero-
sexual and homosexual.
In the next section of this Article, I indicate how contemporary
sexual harassment jurisprudence, in relying upon only a fraction of
the theoretical literature on the social dimensions of human sexu-
ality, fails to take account of this complexity. I then proceed toward
102. Even the word "orientation" betrays the spatial metaphor that corrupts sexuality-
particularly, but not exclusively, in Western/Anglo cultures.
103. See generally LUCE IRIGARAY, SPECULUM OF THE OTHER WOMAN (1985); GAYATRI
CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, THE POST-COLONIAL CRITIC: INTERVIEWS, STRATEGIES, DIALOGUES
(Sarah Harasym ed., 1990).
104. See CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE DISTINCTIONS: SEX, GENDER, AND THE
SOCIAL ORDER 72-98 (1988).
105. SeeJACQUES LACAN, FEMININE SEXUALITY AND THE ECOLE FREUDIENNE 78-85(Juliet
Mitchell &Jacqueline Rose eds.,Jacqueline Rose trans., 1982).
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an alternative conception of sexuality that would animate a qualita-
tively different approach to sexual harassment-one that calls into
question the role of the judiciary in adjudicating harassment
claims.
A. Theories of Sexuality: Toward a New Understanding of Causation
As discussed above, the essential theoretical premises underlying
most sexual harassment law were derived from the work of Catha-
rine MacKinnon. It is indisputable that victims of sexual
harassment are more effectively protected in the post-MacKinnon
era than they were in the pre-MacKinnon era. That said, even
many MacKinnon supporters have been critical of the facility with
which she equates sexual and gendered power. Katherine Franke,
for example, sees MacKinnon's theory as failing to fully explore the
unique ways in which sexually harassing behavior can enforce gen-
der norms among men, as well as women."6 Vicki Schultz, while
generally approving of MacKinnon's view that sexuality and gender
are intricately connected, blames what she calls the "desire-
dominance paradigm" for misinterpreting the basic function of
sexual harassment.' 7 For Schultz, sexual harassment often has little
to do with desire; instead, this harassment is about undermining
worker competence in an effort to assert male privilege and the
exclusivity of male occupational domains.08 Schultz goes further
than Franke by noting that there may be an arena of sexual har-
assment that has nothing to do with efforts to assert gender
inequality at all.' ° Observing that "some discussions and over-
tures-and perhaps even some forms of outright discrimination
based on sexual orientation-are not gender-based attempts at
denigration.""0 Schultz underscores her point that her approach
goes beyond that of MacKinnon and others by declining to "con-
flate harassment on the basis of gender with harassment on the
basis of sexual orientation.""'
Schultz' concern, however, is with the application of Title VII to
gender-based harassment, and she does not elaborate on her view
106. Franke, supra note 65, at 760-62.
107. Vickie Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1687-89
(1998).
108. Id. at 1687.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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that there may be a theoretically or empirically important distinc-
tion between harassment based on gender and harassment based
on sexuality. Doing so would require a move away from the
MacKinnon/radical feminist view of sexuality. There are, however,
other theories of sexual behavior that permit a more complex and
nuanced view of what motivates sexual aggression in the workplace.
Below, I synthesize the insights of psychoanalytic theorist Jessica
Benjamin and political economist Herbert Marcuse to develop a
theory of sexual harassment that can explain the facially incoher-
ent quality of same-sex hostile workplace harassment.
B. Other Perspectives on Sexual Behavior: Jessica Benjamin
In Master/Slave: The Politics of Erotic Domination, Jessica Benjamin
offers an explanation of erotic domination that is rooted in a per-
son's internal conflict between the need for recognition and the
need for independence."2 Benjamin argues that this conflict
plagues each of us throughout our lives."3 Indeed, the emotional
and psychological seeds of this struggle are planted early in in-
fancy. 1 It is then, in early infancy, that we begin to differentiate as
individual beings, against a backdrop of parental care that brings
the conflict between recognition and independence into sharp re-
lief."5 Struggling to assert ourselves, we strive to make an impact
through our infantile acts." 6 The distinction we create and recog-
nize between ourselves and others (the self/other divide) becomes
the central organizing frame of our conscious and unconscious
selves, laying the groundwork for adult patterns of erotic conflict,
violence, and domination/subordination:
What I am describing here is a dialectic of control: if I com-
pletely control the other, then the other ceases to exist, and if
the other completely controls me, then I cease to exist. True
differentiation means maintaining the essential tension of the
112. Jessica Benjamin, Master/Slave: The Politics of Erotic Domination, in POWERS OF DEszRE
280 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983).
113. Id. at 284.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. Here, the prototypical example of the recognition/independence conflict is
the toddler who crawls away from its mother, venturing further and further away from her
control, while periodically looking over its shoulder to ensure that its mother is watching
and appreciating its attempts at independence.
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contradictory impulses to assert the self and respect the
other."
7
This struggle is intensely physical. As an articulation of the
self/other divide, it plays itself out on the borders of the body."" In
practice, this means sexual intimacy is conceived as a transgression
of bodily boundaries-a transgression that is invited or pursued
willingly, but always symbolically promises the ultimate collapse of
the distinction between self and other. 9
The stakes of such a physical exchange are high. 2' Even in a free
world-one not shot through with relations of social inequality-
one could imagine frequent slips from mutually balanced efforts at
control and passivity into a more violent expression of the dialec-
tic; in a world patterned by inequality, erotic violence and
systematic expressions of domination and submission are inevita-
ble. Benjamin understands the gendered quality of erotic
domination to emerge from the gendered fact of parenting. The
"other" in childhood relations is nearly always female. Therefore,
efforts to assert independence are undertaken against a backdrop
of gender difference (in the case of a male child) or gender identi-
fication (in the case of a female child). 2 In this view, male efforts
to individuate are particularly violent and aggressive, because they
must (in a gender stratified and polarized world) entail an express
rejection of the mother and her femaleness. 2 3
117. Id.
118. Although Benjamin deploys the language of object relations analysis, she cites
Georges Bataille's Hegelian approach to eroticism to explain adult sexuality as a function of
this struggle. Id. at 285. In Bataille's work, "eroticism centers around maintaining the ten-
sion between life and death of self." Id.
119. Id. In short, it is ajourney towards death.
120. According to Benjamin, sexual interaction may be contemporary western society's
only outlet for transcendence, replacing religion as the site of this life/death negotiation. Id.
at 295-96.
121. Id. at 284.
122. Benjamin's view borrows here from the object relations analysis of Nancy
Chodorow. Id. at 294.
123. Female children, on the other hand, undergo a more tortured and slow process of
individuation-and one that may never be complete. As an adult, the female "is object. She
serves men as their other, their counterpart, the side of themselves they repress." Id. at 294.
Benjamin is much more thorough in her theorization of male development than female
development in this particular article. Thus, she clearly establishes that male egos are devel-
oped along the lines of rationality, aggression, and a drive to objectify. Benjamin pays less
attention to how female children develop the desire to be objectified. In JESSICA BENJAMIN,
THE BONDS OF LovE: PSYCHOANALYSIS, FEMINISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF DOMINATION 51-84
(1988), Benjamin describes this aspect of the developmental roots of erotic domination
more clearly. As a child, the girl struggles intensely with her need for individuality, which is
masked and made problematic by her identification with her mother. Id. In subjecting her-
self to erotic violation as an adult, the woman is attempting to recognize her physical
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Although Benjamin describes the dynamic of erotic domination
as gendered, its roots are more fundamental than gender itself.
Gender frequently is mapped onto the desire to erotically domi-
nate another such that men dominate and women submit, but this
need not be, and frequently is not, the case. 12' Benjamin even sug-
gests "[t]o an increasing extent this form of individuality is
becoming de-gendered: that is, male and female roles are no
longer as binding as they once were." 2" For Benjamin, gender is
not the central problem posed by the dialectic of control: it is the
polarization of the traits of nurturance and rationality that threat-
ens the peace.126
Benjamin's theory directly applies to our understanding of the
dynamics of workplace harassment. If the drive to dominate is the
drive to assert one's will, where we observe domination and sexual
aggression, we should be looking for the effort to assert the self.
Such an effort becomes especially well-defined in contexts that
threaten a numbing of the self, such as modern workplaces. The
attack on Mark McWilliams, adjudicated in McWilliams v. Fairfax
County Board of Supervisors, thus can be understood as one of the
"strange new forms of collective violation": an effort by
McWilliams' tormentors to experience the will to power that, one
could imagine, is largely thwarted by the day-to-day routine of work
at a small mechanics shop.
127
Group harassment of the sort experienced by McWilliams or Jo-
seph Oncale has been, to courts and laypersons alike, among the
most perplexing forms of harassment there is. Katherine Franke
and Vicki Schultz would explain the harassment as an effort to dis-
cipline masculine identity: to bring those men who do not perform
boundaries-her "self'-by regularly subjecting them to the threats posed by male sexuality,
which can verge on violence and which is frequently expressed as domination. Id.
124. Benjamin, supra note 112, at 294.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 295-96 ("Rationalization and depersonalization in all public areas of life
have by now virtually banished nurturance to the private household, the dwindling maternal
world .... Ironically, domestic privatization seems to encourage strange new collective
forms of violation .... Love is the new religion, and the psychological components of erotic
domination are repeated in the eroticized cult politics of our era. I believe that we are facing
unbearably intensified privatization and discontinuity, unrelieved by expressions of continu-
ity. Given that social structure and culture enforce individual isolation so rigidly, the
transgression that attempts to break it may necessarily be more violent.").
127. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir.
1996). This is not to relieve the employee defendants of responsibility for their actions. It is
merely to explain those actions as they are embedded in larger institutional contexts. It also
is to suggest an implicit solution: to the extent that employees feel isolated, powerless, and
physically and psychically numbed by their work, they are dangerous to their coworkers. The
structure of work is the culprit that can be controlled in this account of harassment.
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their gender according to type into line. But this account is un-
satisfying because, like the courts who adjudicated the cases, it
ignores the expressly sexual dimension of the harassment.
McWilliams and Oncale both had their genitals fondled and both
were threatened with anal penetration.'29 These are expressly sex-
ual forms of harassment and had we observed them being
perpetrated by men against a woman, we would have had little dif-
ficulty in labeling them as such. But the fact that McWilliams and
Oncale are men and were harassed and assaulted by other men
obscures the sexual element of the harassment, even when it is
patently obvious from the facts. In a sense, our inability to under-
stand the harassment is "because of the sex of the plaintiff," while the
harassment itself may not have been.3
C. Other Perspectives on Sexual Behavior: Herbert Marcuse
At a broader level of analysis, the structure of the workplace, not
an internal conflict between the need for recognition and the need
for independence, is the problem. Herbert Marcuse saw this (in an
admittedly stilted Marxian form) nearly sixty years ago. Mixing the
insights of Freudian psychoanalysis and Marxist political econom-
ics, Marcuse's Eros and Civilization posits a theory of civilization as
the progression of "organized domination.' ' 3' The specific form of
domination is determined by the particular requirements of capi-
talism, and includes the sublimation and perversion of eroticism
via the technique of alienation (as it is understood by Marxism). 32
Thus, as Freud noted, sexuality would have to be largely repressed
if society were to advance and progress. 32 Where Marcuse departs
from Freud is at the point of biological determinism. It is not the
fact that social life requires the sublimation of sexuality that pro-
duces the "discontents" of civilization; it is rather the fact that
capitalism-a particular organization of "scarcity"-produces a self-
128. See discussion supra Part II.A.
129. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998); McWilliams, 72
E3d at 1196.
130. That is, the harassment may not have been "because of the sex of the plaintiff," if
by "sex" we mean "gender."
131. HERBERT MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION 34 (1955).
132. In Freud, this is described as the antagonistic relationship between "the pleasure
principle" and the "reality principle." See SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DiSCON-
TENTS 21-32 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1962). For Marcuse, Freud essentially was correct
that there is a conflict between pleasure and "reality"; the need to work is opposed by neces-
sity to the impulse toward the experience of pleasure, including sexual pleasure.
133. Id. at 50-52, 58-60.
[VOL. 39:3
Finding the Sex in Sexual Harassment
perpetuating system of domination that, among other things, re-
quires and exacts a "surplus-repression" of sexuality.1 4 The term
"surplus-repression" connotes two things: that repression is used to
create a surplus for the dominant class, and that there is a surplus
of repression that is experienced under conditions of capitalism.
135
Sexuality increasingly has been organized toward the end of
procreation, and normative sexuality takes place entirely in the
"part-time" world of the full-time worker. The "libido," once a free-
flowing and expansive expression of the sexual self increasingly is
particularized and fragmented under conditions of exploitation
and domination through the social organization of work.3 6 In
short, sexuality is ever narrowed under conditions of capitalism-
from an activity occupying much of our time to one now occupying
only a fraction of each day. What is more, sexuality is increasingly
focused on procreation as it serves the reproductive needs of capi-
talism.
It becomes clear in Marcuse's account what drives the occasional
explosion of sexually inappropriate and even violent behavior in
the workplace: the restrained libido breaks free of its chains in an
effort to subvert the power of the social organization of work.
3 7
134. MARCUSE, supra note 131, at 37 ("Moreover, while any form of the reality principle
demands a considerable degree and scope of repressive control over the instincts, the spe-
cific historical institutions of the reality principle and the specific interests of domination
introduce additional controls over and above those indispensable for civilized human asso-
ciation. These additional controls arising from the specific institutions of domination are
what we denote as surplus-repression.").
135. The effects and consequences of surplus-repression are many and varied. One im-
portant effect is the channeling of desire into particularized forms of expression and, in
fact, particular zones of bodily experience. Marcuse writes, for example, that the "proximity"
senses of smell and taste have been progressively subdued in capitalist societies because
"[t]heir unrepressed development would eroticize the organism to such an extent that it
would counteract the desexualization of the organism required by its social utilization as an
instrument of labor." Id. at 38-39.
136. Id. at 45 ("For the vast majority of the population, the scope and mode of satisfac-
tion are determined by their own labor; but their labor is work for an apparatus which they
do not control, which operates as an independent power to which individuals must submit if
they want to live .... Libido is diverted for socially useful performances in which the indi-
vidual works for himself only in so far as he works for the apparatus, engaged in activities
that mostly do not coincide with his own faculties and desires.").
Lurking underneath this libido-deployed-in-the-service-of-alienated-work is a genuine ex-
pression of the pleasure principle. Marcuse sees the disciplinary stance of modern societies
toward the perversions (that is, non-normative forms of sexuality) as an indication of their
subversive quality. Id. at 50 ("Against a society which employs sexuality as a means for a use-
ful end, the perversions uphold sexuality as an end in itself; they thus place themselves
outside the dominion of the performance principle and challenge its very foundation.").
137. Like Benjamin, Marcuse views eroticism as being closely linked to death. In his
view, however, it is the ostensible function of eros in modern societies to render the destruc-
tive (death) impulse "harmless." But the perversions-and here, "perversions" is used by
Marcuse in a value-neutral way to refer simply to atypical sexual behavior-let the cat out of
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Unable to meaningfully alter the nature of work or its organiza-
tion, the worker-an instrument of labor-experiences a
momentary sensation of power and freedom through the expres-
sion of a perverse sexual impulse.5 8 In this account, the structure
of the workplace produces the impulse to sexual domination 9
Taken together with Benjamin's account of erotic domination,
Marcuse's theory of the antagonistic relationship between eros and
work in capitalist societies points us toward a theory of sexual har-
assment that is not ultimately reducible to gender. This is not to say
that sexual harassment is never about gender inequality. On the
contrary, it may derive from the effort to exert gender dominance
much more often than it derives from any other source. Quid pro
quo forms of harassment, for example, may be explicable largely as
an expression of gender domination. The issue is how to conceive
of desire. If it is conceived in the narrow terms used by most courts
and many feminist theorists, then it is of course true that desire is a
poor explanation of most forms of harassment. But, if the notion
of desire is broadened to include the sorts of conflict-laden, inter-
nally divided, and profoundly constructed impulses and
sensibilities that are at the heart of Benjamin and Marcuse's theo-
ries of domination, then it becomes possible to see how desire is
operative in workplace harassment.
The simple point is that there is some dimension of sexuality
that operates apart from, or at least not in the service of, gender
domination. This, I would argue, is why there has been a great
gnashing of teeth and beating of breasts over the attempt to
squeeze non-paradigmatic cases of sexual harassment into the stiff-
armed embrace of Title VII. Sometimes, sexual harassment really is
about sex.
the bag: they "suggest the ultimate identity of Eros and death instinct, or the submission of
Eros to the death instinct." Id. at 51.
138. Id.
139. The unrestrained libido is (theoretically) a total, physical, and unifying force that
resides in the body and produces the very will to exist. The true perversion is the subordina-
tion of this libido to the strictures of capitalism; once subordinated it becomes twisted,
misguided, and potentially violent unless carefully contained within the bounds of normal,
procreative, part-time sexuality. The occasional release of this distorted libido within the
workplace is dangerous in itself and is an indication of the "fatal dialectic of civilization: the
very progress of civilization leads to the release of increasingly destructive forces." Id. at 54.
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III. TORT REMEDIES: ANTI-GAY HARASSMENT IS NOT
"BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF DECENCY"
A growing sense of the awkwardness of the fit between Title VII
and the realities of sexual harassment has led some critics to advo-
cate for an abandonment of the Title VII framework in whole or in
part.'4° Some believe the framework is ineffective or even treacher-
ous when applied to claims of harassment implicating gay and
lesbian people.1 4' Others believe Title VII has gone too far in pun-
ishing forms of behavior that should not be actionable141 or in
punishing those who are not actually responsible for it-namely,
employers. 43 Among those in the latter group is Mark M. Hager,
who has argued strenuously for replacing Title VII remedies with
traditional tort remedies, of both the common law and constitu-
tional'4 variety.
Tort remedies offer the promise of more directly addressing the
harm of sexual harassment without either requiring or implying-
as the MacKinnon theory of harassment does-that harassment is
always fundamentally about gender inequality. For example, Rosa
Ehrenreich argues that tort remedies are more appropriate vehi-
cles for redressing the "dignitary harms" associated with all forms
of workplace harassment, whether sexual or not.145 She writes that
"Modern tort law embraces the concept of 'dignitary harm,' a
140. See generally Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Under-
standing of Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1 (1999); Mark Mclaughlin Hager, Harassment
as a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Envimnment Liability Should Be Curtailed, 30 CONN. L. REv. 375
(1998); E. Gary Spitko, He Said, He Said: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title Vfi and the
"Reasonable Heterosexist" Standard, 18 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 56 (1997).
141. See generally Ehrenreich, supra note 140; Spitko, supra note 140. These concerns
apply regardless of whether the gay person is the alleged harasser or the alleged victim. Note
that the gender-based approach toward sexual harassment would view the former scenario
quite differently from the latter, whereas the sexuality-based approach would see similar
principles at work in both. What the sexuality-based approach suggests is that the sexual
orientation of the target and the harasser are not determinative of the harm of harassment,
although they are partly constitutive of it. The harm results from the ambiguity, conflict, and
assertion of power that are played out in sexual terms which, because they are sexual, are
especially potent. Whether the harasser is gay or lesbian or heterosexual or bisexual informs
the quality of the conflict, and codes the behavior as either threatening or merely annoying,
but it does not determine in and of itself whether or not desire is at work. Where the behav-
ior takes a sexual form, desire is always at work (if only in its negative valence).
142. See generally Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective
Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 333 (1990).
143. See generally Hager, supra note 140.
144. For example, Hager argues that public employees could bring § 1983 claims on
the grounds that the harassment is being undertaken "under the color of law." Id. at 281-82.
145. Ehrenreich, supra note 140, at 3-5, 44-48.
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harm that injures 'personality interests' ,,46 because tort law under-
stands individuals to have a basic right to personhood and
autonomy.14' Because most instances of harassment-physical as-
saults, batteries, and verbal attacks of various sorts-can be
conceived as invasions of personhood and autonomy, tort law
should provide a direct and precise remedy.
1 48
Relying upon Prosser s149 definitions of the torts of battery, as-
sault, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, Ehrenreich argues that intentional torts cover the sorts of
incidents that arise in the workplace and victimize employees. 50
Ehrenreich claims these torts are designed to be "broad" in their
application, subjected as they are to a simple test of reasonable-
ness.15 1 Unfortunately, courts have not seen it this way. As indicated
in the next section, many courts have erected high bars to pursu-
ing intentional tort actions in workplace claims. 152 Furthermore,
there is evidence that both courts and juries are more likely to find
harassment by a gay man or lesbian actionable than they are to
find harassment against a gay or lesbian worker to be so.
A. Evidence from Case Law: Defining Outrageousness in
Terms of the Parties, Not the Behavior
Existing case law suggests the tort approach to homophobic hos-
tile environment harassment has not gone unnoticed by plaintiffs'
lawyers. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress has
seemed to some a tort designed to offer redress to precisely this
146. Id. at 22.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 40 (5th ed.
1984).
150. Ehrenreich, supra note 140, at 23.
151. Id. Note that the "reasonableness" standard itself may be anything but simple, as
any first year torts casebook would illustrate. The "reasonable person" standard has been
particularly contentious in the area of Title VII law. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of
Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REv.
1398, 1403 (1992); Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman, 1994 U.
ILL. L. REv. 769, 781-93; Deborah B. Goldberg, The Road to Equality: The Application of the
Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 2 CAssDozo WOMEN'S L.J. 195, 212
(1995).
152. See, e.g., Mims v. Carrier Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 706, 710 (E.D. Tex. 2000); Redden v.
Contimortgage Corp., No. 99-4535, 1999 WL 1257280, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1999).
153. See Kelly v. City of Oakland, 198 E3d 779, 784-85 (9th Cir. 1999); Merritt v. Del.
River Port Auth., Civil Action No. 98-3313, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5896, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 20, 1999); Harris v. Pameco Corp., 12 P.3d 524, 532 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
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sort of offensive behavior.1 5 4 The problem has been that a success-
ful cause of action must demonstrate-in the words of most
common law definitions of the tort-that the behavior was outra-
geous and "exceed[ed] all bounds usually tolerated by decent
society."'55 In a society characterized by institutionalized heterosex-
ism, 56 few acts of homophobia meet the definition.
In Mims v. Carrier Corp., for instance, the plaintiff Quentin T.
Mims alleged that two coworkers, in the presence of other cowork-
ers, accused him of having a sexual relationship with a male
coworker.157 Mims further alleged that coworkers made obscene
and "offensive" gestures indicating Mims' engagement in homo-
sexual acts as part of this "teasing.", 58 Mims complained to
supervisors about the behavior, but it continued "unabated."59
Moreover, he alleged the supervisors retaliated against him for rais-
ing the complaints by, among other things, physically removing
him from the premises in front of fellow workers in a "humiliating"
and injurious fashion.' 6° The court spilled little ink in dismissing
Mims' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, stating
that "the individual defendants comments do not 'shock the con-
science' . . . . The teasing, obscenities, and other unpleasantness
endured by Mims-while unfortunate-do not rise to the required
level for such extraordinary relief." 16
Likewise, in the case of Redden v. Contimortgage Corp., 62 plaintiff
Norman Redden alleged that his coworkers engaged in anti-gay
harassment over a period of more than a year, during which they
called him a "fag," made reference to his supposed knowledge of
homosexual acts, referred to his weekend activity as a "sausage
party," made gestures indicating that he was masturbating under
his desk, sang parodies of a Village People song, and made fre-
quent derogatory comments about gay men to him. Redden
complained to supervisors, but ultimately resigned from his posi-
tion as a result of the harassment. 6 3 The court began its discussion
of Redden's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress by
154. Ehrenreich, supra note 140, at 23.
155. KEETON ET AL., supra note 149, at 60.
156. That is, in a society where the preference for heterosexual behavior and identity is
codified in institutional practices.
157. Mints, 88 E Supp. 2d at 710.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Mims alleged that, while talking with a group of friends, he was grabbed forcefully
by the wrist by a supervisor and ushered out of the building. Id.
161. Id. at 721.
162. Redden v. Contimortgage Corp., No. 99-4535, 1999 WL 1257280, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 22, 1999).
163. Id.
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establishing a particularly high bar for workplace sexual harass-
ment: "offensive comments and gestures in the workplace,
although sexually explicit, do not constitute the type of extreme
and outrageous conduct necessary to sustain a claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress."" That said, the court in
Redden admitted that a tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, while difficult to prove in a case of workplace harassment,
was not impossible to make out.65 Nonetheless, it held that Red-
den's claim did not meet this standard and was properly
dismissed.
166
The question arises, then, as to which sorts of harassment claims
might be actionable in tort. Specifically, can anti-gay harassment
ever rise to the level of "outrageousness" that is required? The case
of Simpson v. Burrows provides a clue. 167 In Simpson, a lesbian lodge
owner was harassed when a town resident circulated anti-lesbian
letters to the entire community, which hindered her ability to run
her business.'8 The letters contained anti-gay rhetoric and pointed
death threats169 and were sufficient to cause the appellate court in
that case to dismiss defendant's motion for summary judgment."'
The court found the threatening quality of the letters reached the
level of extremity and outrageousness required to make out the
tort, 7 ' but this decision hardly can be encouraging to gay employ-
ees seeking redress for constructive exile by less dramatic forms of
homophobia. In permitting the case to go forward, the Simpson
court emphasized the death threats as well as the fact that the har-
assment prevented the lodge owner from earning a living.72 Most
cases of anti-gay harassment will not reach these thresholds.
Another case indicating how courts are likely to examine tort
claims relating to homophobic harassment is Nance v. M.D. Health
Plan, Inc.171 In Nance, the plaintiff alleged a variety of wrongs
against his employer, including racial discrimination and inten-
tional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 74 The
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was grounded in
the fact that Nance's supervisor questioned Nance's subordinates
164. Id. at *3.
165. Id. at *2-3.
166. Id. at *3.
167. Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Or. 2000).
168 Id. at 1114-15.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1124.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1123-24.
173. Nance v. M.D. Health Plan, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 276 (D. Conn. 1999).
174. Id. at 277.
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about his sexual orientation, ostensibly as part of his investigation
of a same-sex harassment complaint lodged against Nance. 75 Al-
though the court rejected Nance's contention that such
questioning, per se, constituted outrageous conduct,116 it refused to
grant defendant's motion for summary judgment on the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claim.1 77  The court's
reasoning in this regard is instructive:
Many homosexuals take great care to conceal their sexual ori-
entation from those with whom they work for fear of
humiliation or actual physical risk if their homosexuality is
disclosed. An employer's questioning that signals to others its
belief that the subject employee is a homosexual in reckless
disregard of a foreseeable, unsavory response by those per-
sons thus informed, could constitute extreme and outrageous
conduct. Whether this case represents any such circumstances
171
awaits a more fully developed record ....
The case is unclear as to whether Nance claimed he was or was not,
in fact, gay. The court is careful to contextualize its concerns about
maintaining the sanctity of the closet within a recognition of the
"continuing homophobia, discrimination and even fatal violence
directed towards homosexuals" 79 that makes disclosure of one's
sexual orientation potentially dangerous. Nonetheless, what seems
clear from the court's acceptance of the idea that one could make
out a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in a case
alleging anti-gay harassment is the fact that the harm alleged is not
the harassment itself but the surreptitious labeling of a person as
gay when they have not labeled themselves as such in "public."'8 °
What Minis, Redden, and Nance thus demonstrate is that, in the
courts' eyes, garden variety homophobic harassment is not beyond
175. Id.
176. Id. at 279. The court noted that the context of such questioning would be impor-
tant in determining whether or not it constituted "extreme and outrageous conduct." Id. In
this case, the court noted that "here the employer's questions were within the context of a
same-sex sexual harassment investigation." Id. These facts undercut Nance's claim, but the
court permitted the case to go forward because it could not rule out the possibility that
Nance could demonstrate, for example, that he was "personally subjected to any direct ques-
tioning, references or harassment about his sexual orientation or personal relationships." Id.
Presumably, such conduct might make out the elements of the claim.
177. Id. at 279.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. For a similar case in the Title VII context, see Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403,
410 (D. Mass. 2002).
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"all possible bounds of decency,"81 while the disruption of the
closet-exposing a person as gay, or labeling a person as gay-
crosses the threshold.1 8 2 A person who has taken "great care to con-
ceal"' 8 his or her homosexuality may bring an action against a
supervisor who authoritatively puts into question that person's sex-
ual orientation. But a person subjected to direct, vicious, repeated,
and graphic sexual insults relating to his or her perceived sexual
orientation is not protected by the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The implication is that the employee in the lat-
ter case has done something to trigger the perception-whether
true or not-and thus has forfeited the protection of the tort
claim. In the language of Marcuse, the employee in the former
case has taken affirmative action to maintain the separation be-
tween work and perverse desire, while the employee in the latter
case has unleashed the destructive forces of surplus-repression
upon himself by bringing perversity itself into the workplace.' It is
little wonder, from a Marcusian standpoint, that the courts would
choose to discipline the conduct of the employer in the former
case while leaving the employee in the latter case to his own de-
vices. Both approaches function to sustain the dialectic;
homophobia is a tool of workplace alienation.
There is, therefore, at least one reason why Ehrenreich's ap-
proach would be unlikely to work any fundamental change in the
treatment of same-sex harassment under tort law: in a heterosexist
society, homophobia is rarely outrageous.'85 Further support for
this notion emerges from tort cases involving homosexual advances
made towards assertedly heterosexual men.'86 Although there are
few cases on record from which one might generalize, there is evi-
dence that courts are more willing to find sufficient
"outrageousness" in cases alleging unwelcome homosexual ad-
vances. In Harris v. Pameco Corp.,8 7 the plaintiff was an assertedly
heterosexual man who had put the defendant on notice that he
believed homosexuality was immoral. The defendant, Harris' su-
181. Mims v. Carrier Corp., 88 E Supp. 2d 706, 720 (E.D. Tex. 2000); Redden v. Conti-
mortgage Corp., No. 99-4535, 1999 WL 1257280, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1999).
182. Nance, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 279.
183. Id.
184. MARCUSE, supra note 131, at 34.
185. It should be noted that Ehrenreich was not concerned expressly with homophobic
harassment. Nonetheless, the point can be extended to heterosexual forms of harassment:
in a sexist society, harassment against women is rarely outrageous. See Ehrenreich, supra note
140, at 33.
186. Kelly v. City of Oakland, 198 F.3d 779, 782-83, 785 (9th Cir. 1999); Merritt v. Del.
River Port Auth., Civil Action No. 98-3313, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5896, at *19-22 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 20, 1999); Harris v. Pameco Corp., 12 P.3d 524, 532 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
187. Harris, 12 P.3d at 527.
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pervisor, nevertheless engaged in several behaviors that the plain-
tiff found sexually threatening, including putting his arm around
plaintiffs neck, touching him on the knee, and offering him a
"big, wet kiss" if he met certain production goals.188 Plaintiff's su-
pervisor also made two comments that Harris took to be invitations
to join him in bed. 8 9
In examining the plaintiff's cause of action for the torts of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress and battery, the court
emphasized the importance of Harris' prior disclosure of his feel-
ings regarding homosexuality.' 90 Not only did this discussion help
establish the "intent" requirement of the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim, it also made the defendant supervisor's
touching more likely to be deemed "offensive" by a jury (and thus
a battery):
It is also inferable from plaintiffs testimony that George's
touching was sexual in nature in light of plaintiffs previously
expressed views about homosexuality and his reactions when
touched. It is also inferable that George knew that his conduct
would be considered objectively offensive when considered in
the context of his course of conduct.19'
In deciding the question of whether ajury could find the supervi-
sor's conduct "beyond the bounds of socially tolerable conduct,"
the court noted simply that the comments were sexual in nature
and therefore (in the context of the supervisor/employee relation-
ship) could be deemed sexually harassing and intolerable.9
The Harris case is notable for its matter-of-fact approach to the
question of whether sexually harassing conduct can be deemed
socially outrageous.9 3  Other cases reviewing allegations of
188. Id. at 527-28.
189. The first such incident occurred at a hotel where the parties were attending a
business function. Harris' supervisor greeted him at his hotel door while wearing his boxer
shorts, then climbed under the sheets of his hotel room bed and asked Harris why he
"didn't ... just get in bed." Id. at 527. The second incident occurred during a conversation
about a head cold suffered by the supervisor. Harris opined that he should not get "too
close" to the supervisor. In response, the supervisor stated: "Does that mean I cannot invite
you to my bed?" Id. at 527-28.
190. Id. at 529.
191. Id.
192. Id. The court relied on precedent in reaching this conclusion. The cited case in-
volved a claim of opposite-sex sexual harassment and the court found no reason to
distinguish it from the same-sex case at bar. Id. (citing McGanty v. Staudenraus, 901 P.2d 841
(Or. 1995)). This, alone, marks the court's approach as distinctive from those alleging anti-
gay sexual harassment as a tort.
193. The case is notable, that is, when compared to those cases alleging torts arising
from anti-gay hostile environments.
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unwelcome homosexual advances are similarly straightforward in
concluding that a jury could reasonably find such conduct to be
outrageous. 94 The question that naturally presents itself, then, is
"why?" Why are courts relatively untroubled when leaving inten-
tional tort cases alleging a gay sexual harasser to the vicissitudes of
jury deliberations, while decidedly unwilling to permit cases alleg-
ing anti-gay sexual harassment the same fate? It is ironic and
unfortunate that the cases that are most unlikely to find an alterna-
tive form of redress are precisely the cases that courts are least
likely to permit to go forward as common law tort claims.
CONCLUSION: WHAT CAN (OR SHOULD) THE LAW Do?
If neither Title VII nor the common law torts currently provide
adequate remedies to homophobic hostile work environments and,
instead, appear to exacerbate the inequities faced by gay and les-
bian workers, does this mean that the law is powerless to redress
this harm? Conceptually, a federal statutory solution might seem to
offer a workable alternative. Congress could enact a statute that
expressly forbids anti-gay or -lesbian harassment in the workplace
or, even more directly, forbids any form of sexuality-based work-
place discrimination. Indeed, some in Congress have tried,
repeatedly introducing the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(ENDA), which would prohibit workplace discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. 95 While firmly anchored in the settled,
centrist jurisprudence of nondiscrimination, ENDA consistently
has been rejected by Congress since 1996.196 Yet even were the bill
to be enacted into law, 97 it would closely track the language of Title
194. Most such cases allege far more egregious conduct than that alleged by Harris. But
it is an open question whether such conduct is any more egregious than that faced by plain-
tiffs like Edison Spearman, who was regularly taunted; was referred to as a "nigger," a "fag," a
"punk-ass," and a "bitch;" was the subject of graffiti stating that he had AIDS; and had his
toolbox stolen and his tools destroyed while on medical leave for treatment of depression.
Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1082-86 (7th Cir. 2000). The point here is not
that employees like Harris are not alleging "outrageous" enough conduct or that employees
like Spearman are; rather, it is to suggest that determinations of what a reasonable jury might
find outrageous are likely the product of homophobic assumptions about sexually offensive
behavior.
195. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) of 1999, H.R. 2355, 106th Cong.
(1999).
196. Most recently, in 2003 a version of ENDA was introduced as part of Senate Bill 16,
but was the object of no further congressional action. 149 CONG. REc. S16, S134 (daily ed.
Jan. 9,2003).
197. At present, efforts to pursue the legislation have stalled in the wake of the gay mar-
riage juggernaut.
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VII; in essence, drafters have simply added the words "sexual orien-
tation" to those of "sex, race, national origin .... ,,9 As a result,
there is little reason to believe that ENDA would effect much of a
shift in existing sexual harassment jurisprudence. To the contrary,
by adding the categorical identifier "sexual orientation" to the list
of protected classes, ENDA would fail to break out of the dualistic
conception of sexuality that has served to undermine the effective-
ness of the existing harassment framework to create conditions of
sexual equality. Indeed, the proposed reform would reinforce this
dualism; "sexual orientation" invokes a spatial metaphor that in-
vites the trier of fact to locate and fix sexual identity and desire.9 9
Moreover, there are good reasons to question the wisdom of ap-
proaching the project of sexual freedom and equality via state-
centric, juridical strategies. As Wendy Brown has argued in States of
Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity, progressive politics in
late modern capitalist democracies require, at a minimum, an in-
terrogation of the relationship between rights-based tactics of
political inclusion and the structures of domination they are imag-
ined to subvert.00 Modern identity politics, grounded in a politics
of ressentiment-of injury and the fantasy of redress-feed from,
and into, systems of oppression based on articulated statuses.
Brown writes:
While the effort to replace liberalism's abstract formulation of
equality with legal recognition of injurious social stratifica-
tions is understandable, what such arguments do not query is
whether legal "protection" for a certain injury-forming iden-
tity discursively entrenches the injury-identity connection it
denounces. Might such protection codify within the law the
very powerlessness it aims to redress? Might it discursively col-
lude with the conversion of attribute into identity, of a
historical effect of power into a presumed cause of victimiza-
tion?
20
'
The problem, as Brown articulates it, is not simply that the law dis-
ables subjectivity through protectionist interventions, but rather
that injury claims become constitutive of identity through the
198. ENDA, supra note 195. Note, however, that recent revisions of the bill have inserted
express prohibitions of quotas and preferential hiring treatment for gay men and lesbians,
as well as an express exemption for religious organizations. Id.
199. The causation requirement remains in force, thus necessitating an inquiry into
whether the conduct at issue was undertaken "because of' plaintiff's sexual orientation. See
ENDA, supra note 195, at§ 4(a) (1).
200. BROWN, supra note 28, at 21.
201. Id.
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disciplinary effects of state action."2 Classification and categoriza-
tion are the modus vivendi of the institutions comprising modern
statehood-courts, bureaucracies, regulatory bodies, etc.-and
claims for inclusion and recognition (conceived as "rights") that
are grounded in injury do little to unsettle the systems of domina-
tion that produce such injuries in the first place.2 °3 Indeed, the
politics of ressentiment may "unwittingly increase the power of the
state and its various regulatory discourses at the expense of politi-
cal freedom."0 4
Ultimately, the problem of sexually hostile work environments is
so deeply embedded in the psychology of work and sexuality that
its source is beyond the reach ofjudicial action. If we take seriously
the claims of theorists like Jessica Benjamin and Herbert Marcuse,
we must admit that the dysfunctional quality of the work-sex nexus
is endemic to advanced capitalist societies. We cannot hope to pre-
vent the excesses of sexual repression in the service of alienated
labor through thinly worded statutes wielded by the likes of An-
tonin Scalia or even Ruth Bader Ginsberg. Nor can we expect that
workplaces will ever become de-sexualized, as long as they remain
repetitive, sterile environments where nobody is enjoying his or
her job very much. The true solution to sexual harassment in the
workplace lies in a transformation of the workplace, not a trans-
formation of the law. Efforts to bend the law in directions that are
marginally less heterosexist may, if successful, offer incremental
compensation to some gay and lesbian individuals suffering the
consequences of the radically unbalanced dialectics of control char-
acterizing modern workplaces and psychosocial development. But,
these efforts will do little to strike at the homophobic core of bi-
nary conceptions of sexuality and, consequently, will fail to disinter
the systems of oppression that produce acts of harassment, vio-
lence, intimidation, and domination in the workplace.
At best, reformation of the existing sexual harassment jurispru-
dence will fail to move the project of sexual equality forward. At
worst, it will serve more deeply to inscribe the terms of sexual op-
pression, and willingly submit the articulation of sexual identities,
practices, and communities to the disciplinary capacity of the state.
If freedom inheres in the "struggle against what will otherwise be
done to and for us,"105 this willing submission to law's denominative
and generative apparatus-an apparatus that serves to delimit the
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 28.
205. Id. at 25.
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possibilities of existence-amounts to a forfeiture of freedom's de-
fining praxis. A victory in achieving inclusion of sexual orientation
within the ambit of Title VII's protection against sexual harassment
would thus be Pyrrhic, and advocates of gender and sexual equality
would do well to consider an alternative, political, course of action.

